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Abstract 
Security specifications are controls and constraints on the behavior of the software and can be used to develop more secure 
software from the beginning. Many specification languages have been proposed to represent security specifications. However, all 
these specification languages are at a higher level of abstraction and can only be used to represent overall business-level design 
decisions. Such specifications provide guidance to the developers but do not lay out the details of the dynamic behavior that has 
to be implemented during the coding phase. In this paper, we propose to use UML state machine diagrams to represent detailed 
dynamic behavior of design-level security specifications. We argue that these behaviors when used by the developer for 
implementation will enable them to avoid crucial security vulnerabilities. 
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1. Introduction 
Software can be made more secure by building them in a secure manner. When a vulnerability is reported in a 
software, new security requirements, design decisions, and implementation guidelines are devised and proposed to 
avoid and mitigate that vulnerability in the future. These requirements, design decisions, and implementation 
guidelines are controls and constraints on the software and are made widely available through databases such as 
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Common Weakness Enumeration1 (CWE) and Open Web Application Security Project2 (OWASP). Most of the 
time, in these databases and also other places, a textual explanation of the vulnerability and its mitigations is 
provided. In some cases, security specification languages such as UMLsec3, Misuse Cases4, Abuse Cases5, 
SecureUML6, and SecureTropos7 have also been used. However, the higher level of abstraction in diagrammatic 
specification languages such as UMLsec and SecureTropos and the inherent ambiguity of the textual specification 
languages can be an impeding factor for the developers and programmer to actually use these mitigations correctly.  
This results in the developers and programmers in devise their own ways in which to implemented higher-level 
security specifications. 
We classify security specifications into two categories: static and dynamic. Static specifications are those that 
deal with decisions and guidelines which indicate what should be used and what should be avoided. An example of a 
static security specification is that it is recommended to avoid the “printf” function in the C/C++ language to 
circumvent the possibility of the format string vulnerability. Dynamic security specifications, on the other hand, 
define how the software should behave in a particular situation. The behavior of an authentication mechanism is an 
example of dynamic security specification. 
In the current vulnerabilities databases (e.g., CWE and OWASP), none of the dynamic security specifications has 
a detailed design-level behavioral description (textual or diagrammatic) that can be used by the developers and 
programmers in the implementation phase. The information about what has to be done or avoided is available but the 
details of how to achieve the goal is left to the developers’ imagination and expertise. For example, a security 
specification may require the authentication mechanism to lock a user after a certain number of incorrect login 
attempts. However, developers will have to implement this security specification on their own and may make 
mistakes in checks and balances (e.g., how many incorrect login attempts, when to unlock, and what time interval if 
any should be used). This level of detail is necessary in the design phase because the implemented software can then 
be verified for bugs and flaws in the assurance phase. However, if the design is not at all available, then the security 
assurance phase will not be able to concentrate its efforts. From example, the test cases against the high-level 
security specification “lock the user after x incorrect login attempts” will not know the value of x if it is not defined 
in the design document. The value of x will not be available in the requirements or high level-design document. In 
the absence of the value of x, the developer will be free to choose a value of x. However, the security demands of the 
system being implemented may be too hard to allow a large value. In which case, the choice of the developer for a 
bigger value may have a negative impact on the security of the software. Moreover, when the software is being 
tested, the assurance team will not know how many incorrect login attempts should be allowed based on the 
software’s security profile.     
To solve the above mentioned issues, in this paper, we propose that dynamic security specifications should be 
represented in UML state machine diagrams which are a widely understood and used behavior representation 
diagram. Other languages such as SecureUML and UMLsec have attempted to describe dynamic behavior however 
they are at a higher level of abstraction and the possibility for the developers to incorrectly implement intended 
security specifications remains. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a literature review of 
existing secure specification languages. In Section 3, we describe, through the use of a case study, how UML state 
machines can be used to effectively represent a number of security specifications. Section 4 concludes this paper by 
summarizing the work and discussing future work. 
2. Related work  
UMLsec3 is a stereotype based extension of UML to develop secure software systems. It uses stereotypes, tags, 
and constraints to specify security specifications in use case diagrams, class diagrams, state machine diagrams, 
activity diagrams, sequence diagrams, and deployments diagrams. UMLsec defines 21 stereotypes to represent fair 
exchange, non-repudiation, role-based access control, secure communication link, confidentiality, integrity, 
authenticity, freshness of a message, secure information flow among components, and guarded access. Some 
stereotypes also have associated tags and constraints. In our proposal we do not use tags and stereotypes to represent 
security specifications. Although, tags and stereotypes do convey the overall security requirements, they lack the 
“how” component of a security specifications. In our proposal, we use state machine diagrams to represent the 
intended dynamic behavior of security mechanisms. 
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SecureUML6 is an extension of UML which can be used for specifying role-based access control policies. 
SecureUML stereotypes can be used to annotate a class diagram with role-based access control information. 
SecureUML uses the Object Constraint Language (OCL) to specify constraints for resources, actions, and 
permissions. Contrary to UMLsec, these constraints can be specified according to the individual software’s 
requirements. SecureUML is different from out proposed approach as we use state machine diagrams to represent all 
those security specifications that can be represented in a state machine. However, in SecureUML, the authors only 
discuss how role-based access control policies can be represented. 
SecureTropos7 uses the notions of actor (person(s), organization(s), or software), goals, soft goal (a goal whose 
fulfillment cannot be explicitly determined), task, resource, security constraint, secure goal, secure task, and secure 
resource. An actor can depend on another actor to accomplish a goal or soft goal, perform a task, or deliver a 
resource. The SecureTropos notation can be used to represent security constraints (requirements) on interactions 
between actors during the requirement specification phase. SecureTropos is different from UML state machine as it 
used goals and actors. This level if more close to a UML use case diagram. Although beneficial, SecureTropos does 
not address the issue of providing detailed instructions to the developer on how a security specification should be 
implemented. 
A misuse case4 is a UML use case to represent undesirable behavior. Misuse cases can be used to elicit more use 
cases to neutralize the threats. Two special relations called “prevents” and “detects” relate use cases and misuse 
cases. The authors provide a stepwise process according to which, first use cases and actors and then misuse cases 
and mis-actors should be specified. After this, the potential “include” relationships between misuse and use cases 
should be identified. Next, new use cases should be specified to detect or prevent misuse cases. These new use cases 
form the high level security requirements of the software and they are called as “security use cases”8. 
Another way to specify undesirable behavior of a piece of software using UML use case diagrams is to develop 
an abuse case5 model. An abuse case model specifies harmful interactions using actors and abuse cases. There is no 
notational difference between the components of a UML use case diagram and an abuse case model. The authors 
propose that all the potential harmful interactions should be specified e.g., different potential approaches to perform 
a denial of service attack should be specified as separate abuse cases. The authors recommend using a tree structure 
to elicit these multiple approaches. This adds more detail to the model and allows in identifying all possible security 
measures. Details about actors such as their resources, skills, and objective should also be included as text. 
According to the authors, abuse cases can be used to guide design and testing. As compared to the approach 
proposed in this paper, both Abuse and Misuse cases remain in the requirement specification phase and do not 
contribute to the design of the target software.  
3. UML state machine diagrams for security specifications 
Security specifications are controls and constraints on the software that are necessary to avoid security 
vulnerabilities9-11. Security specifications restrict the manner in which the software provides its functionality11. 
Security specifications may be elicited during any of the requirements, design, and implementation phases9 of secure 
software development. In the following subsections, we first classify security specifications and then describe how 
security specifications can be represented in UML state machine diagrams. 
3.1. Classifying security specifications 
Security specifications can be classified based on the type of constraint they impose on the software. Avoiding 
the use of pointers (dangling pointers vulnerability) and printf (format string vulnerability) function are guidelines 
that restrict the use of a certain part of the C/C++ programming language. Similarly, using security mechanisms 
such as authentication and role based access control are decisions that are made during the requirements phase. The 
aforementioned security specifications are examples of static security specifications as they identify what should 
and should not be used but do not specify how something should be used. 
In contrast, some security specifications require the software to function in a specific manner. The intended 
behavior of the authentication and role based access control mechanisms are examples of dynamic security 
specifications. A new implementation of the printf function that circumvents the possibility of the format string 
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vulnerability while providing the same functionality will also be regarded as a dynamic security specification. Note 
that such a function is already implemented and available in C/C++ language. The correct allocation and destruction 
of the allocated memory after the software has finished using it, and opening and closing of ports in a network 
protocol after the assigned task is finished are further examples of dynamic security specifications. 
3.2. Authentication mechanism related security specifications 
Authentication mechanisms are widely used to ensure that only legitimate users are allowed access to a particular 
data or service. Its importance demands that there are no vulnerabilities in the authentication mechanism. Over the 
years, many vulnerabilities within the implementations of authentication mechanisms have been identified and their 
corresponding security specifications have been proposed in the literature. Table 1 lists some of the crucial 
vulnerabilities that have been reported. The third column of the table presents the security specifications that should 
be used to avoid and remove these vulnerabilities (according to the CWE and OWASP databases). Note that all these 
security specifications are dynamic in nature. 
Table 1. Some of the security specifications related to the authentication mechanism listed in CWE and OWASP. 
 Vulnerablity name Example of the vulnerability Security specification to remove the vulnerability 




Incorrect login attempts are not 
recorded.  
For every incorrect attempt, the component should 
increment the attempts counter by exactly 1. 
2 Access is granted even when 
the user is locked out. 
Access should be denied if username is incorrect or if the 
user is already locked out. 
3 CWE-307: Improper 
restriction on excessive 
authentication attempts. 
A user can attempt to login 
without any restriction on the 
number of incorrect attempts. 
Access should be denied if the password is incorrect and the 
current attempt is first or second. If the current attempt is 
the third and password is incorrect, then the user should be 
locked out.  
4 CWE 262: Not using 
password aging. The password has no age limit. 
If the user does not change an old password, then he/she 
should not be given access. 
3.3. UML representation of dynamic security specifications 
Each dynamic security specification represents a specific behavior which has to be implemented to fulfil the goal 
of the corresponding security specification. Extended finite state machines, which are the foundation of UML state 
machine diagrams, are widely used to represent dynamic behaviors of systems. Hence, we argue that every dynamic 
security specification can be adequately represented in the form of a UML state machine diagram. All the 
constraints in the security specifications have to be represented as decision points based on values of appropriate 
variables in the UML state machine diagram. The final states will represent the eventual goals (positive or negative) 
of the security specification. We further elaborate this in this section by constructing a UML state machine for the 
security specifications listed in Table 1. 
The first security specification in the table indicates that the algorithm of the authentication mechanism should be 
correct. A concrete instance of this security specification may be that at the occurrence of an incorrect login attempt, 
the counter that keeps track of the incorrect attempts should be incremented by exactly one. This scenario can be 
represented as the variable attempts is incremented as an action on the transition (S3 Æ S4) when the state S3 
detects an incorrect attempt. Similarly, the authentication algorithm should check whether the user has already been 
locked out due to previous incorrect attempts before granting access. This check can be applied as a guard condition 
on the transition (S2 Æ Final). 
The third security specification places a restriction on the number of incorrect login attempts. The number of 
allowed incorrect attempts should be reasonable. Usually a minimum of three incorrect login attempts are allowed 
after which the user is locked. An excessive number of allowed incorrect login attempts may open the door for brute 
force attacks like the dictionary attack1 & 2. In our case, we have set this limit at three as indicated by the event on the 
transition from S3 Æ S6. This indicates that a check can also be represented as an event that triggers a transition. 
Moreover, according to the specification, if the password is incorrect and the current login attempt is only the first or 
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the second, then the authentication mechanism should only deny access. This condition is again denoted as a guard 
on the transition between states S4 and Final. 
The UML state machine representation of the security specifications listed in Table 1 is presented in Figure 1. 
The notations for the relational and assignment operations in the figure are consistent with the C/C++ programming 
language. Each constraint in the security specifications is represented as a decision point which in turn is depicted as 
a state with two or more outgoing edges. Each outgoing edge is representative of one option of the decision point. 
For example, we have five decision points in the state machine diagram in Figure 1. These decision points are at 


























Fig. 1. UML representation of dynamic security specifications for the authentication mechanism 
S1 branches off based on the validity of the username; however this is not the result of any security specification. 
S2 branches off based on whether the user is currently locked out or not and S3 branches off based on the 
correctness of the password. Branches in S2 and S3 are a result of the constraints in the second security 
specification. S4 branches off based on number of incorrect password attempts and is based on the second half of the 
third security specification. Finally, S5 branches off based on the age of the password and is based on the fifth 
security specification. It should be noted that all the decision points directly correspond to the word “if” in each of 
the security specifications. Correspondingly, all these decision points will be implemented as if-else statements in 
the actual code. The first security specification is different in that it does not need a decision point: it is a statement 
and is fulfilled by an action i.e., attempts++ on the transition from S3 to S4. 
3.4. Benefits of the proposed approach 
The representation of low-level design which can be directly translated to code has the immense benefit of 
removing any ambiguity and inconsistencies that may arrive when a high-level design is handed over to the 
developers. It should be noted that most of the security vulnerabilities are a direct result of not following the secure 
design decisions or ignoring security requirements in the implementation phase. Another advantage of representing 
/ Print “Logged in” 
tempage 
<= age 
password incorrect / 
attempts++ 
password correct / 
update lastactivitytime 
tempage > age 
username 
valid 
attempts == 3 
S1 
entry / verifyusername 
S2 
entry / verifystatus 
username invalid




entry / verifypassword 
status == locked 




entry / verifyattempts  




entry / verifypasswordage 
S7 
entry / changepassword 
Else 
S6 
entry / status = locked  
S8 
entry / status = logged in 
/ Print “user locked 
out due to too many 
incorrect attempts” 
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security specifications using UML state machine diagrams is that the security specifications from the requirements 
and high-level design stages can be easily traced in the low-level design and eventually in the code.  
Developing the UML state machine diagrams with security specifications will have some associated cost. 
However, UML state machine diagrams are already used to represent low-level design details during software 
development and security specifications only serve as restrictions on the already developed dynamic behavior. 
Hence, the overhead of introducing security specifications into UML state machine diagrams will be minimal. A 
further advantage will be that the same state machine diagrams can be used to develop test cases that will also 
include security scenarios. Therefore, any additional effort regarding security testing will not be required.    
4. Conclusions 
Software can be designed to function in a secure manner while it is being developed. This involves incorporating 
security specifications in the design of the software. Traditionally, only the high-level design is annotated with 
security related information such as the inclusion of certain security mechanisms. However, security specifications 
dictate certain constraints on the behavior of the software. These constraints are necessary to fulfill the security 
specifications. When the high-level design is used for implementation purposes, there is a possibility of incorrect 
implementation. Hence, there is a need to present the developers with detailed low-level design of the dynamic 
behavior of the software incorporating the constraints imposed by the security specifications. 
To achieve this goal, we, in this paper, argue through the example of an authentication mechanism that UML 
state machine diagrams are capable and should be used to represent low-level dynamic behavior imposed by security 
specification. We have incorporated some of the existing security specification from the CWE and OWASP 
databases in our authentication mechanism. As UML state machine diagrams are already being used in the software 
industry therefore any additional effort for learning a new security specification language is not required. Moreover, 
vulnerabilities due to inconsistencies between design and code are also avoided because the developers have been 
provided with low-level design. A future work maybe to develop UML state machine diagrams for all the security 
specifications from CWE and OWASP and store them in an open-access repository for designers and developers to 
freely access.  
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